Engineering Lab in Immersive VR--An Embodied Approach to Training Wafer Preparation

This paper reports an immersive virtual reality lab (iVRLab) training environment that offers college students an immersive and embodied experience in engineering lab work. The iVRLab provides a simple and safe environment for students to learn the complex lab operations to process and prepare silicon wafers. It features highly embodied interactions congruent to the actual body movements to manipulate the lab devices and materials in the physical world. Fourteen college students participate the lab training and the study results reveal positive learning effects, confidence levels of accomplishment, and embodied experiences. Students' cognitive load is also measured, and its relationship with the embodied experiences is examined and discussed. The study offers a reference for peer researchers and practitioners for the design and implementation of immersive VR systems for engineering lab training. It also sketches a complementary approach during the time like the pandemic to practicing authentic lab work without having to be in a real classroom or laboratory.

DISINFECTION WITH VAPORIZED HYDROGEN PEROXIDE FLUID IN DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENTS AND ITS APPLICATIONS AND ADVANTAGES IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

During a global pandemic, mitigating the impact of the disease and coordinating efforts to manage not only the medical but also the logistical and administrative aspects of such an all-encompassing phenomenon are of paramount importance. An extremely important but less publicised issue in this context is laboratory management and safety in analytical laboratories. In times of high capacity utilisation, as is the case during a pandemic or endemic outbreak of disease, other routine processes have to be abbreviated or are cancelled altogether due to lack of planning owing to the rapid emergence of the outbreak. In order to achieve high level of cleanliness in laboratories of all shapes and sizes and with different requirements, a universal solution seems unimaginable. Our experiments show a promising, automated approach of disinfection of various spaces. Within a short timeframe of 1 h – 3 h it is possible to disinfect any desired room to achieve a laboratory grade hygiene status. This was proven by employing biological indicators validated for this procedure. The tested technology reduced the indicator germs by a concentration of the mathematical log 6 reduction. Achieving this high level of cleanliness is possible by assigning a single person to the task for the set-up at the scene. Steering and monitoring of the process can be done remotely. While the machine used in our experiments is not a completely new concept, our experiments in a real-life setting such as laboratories and clinics alike, show that the applied hydrogen peroxide vapour distributed by a specialized fogger, disinfects even hard to reach spots within closed-off spaces. This program can be performed while automated (PCR) machines are running and highly trained personnel can apply their expertise elsewhere. Moreover, while the program is running real-time data is available and the process can be remotely monitored and steered digitally. It is of major concern to ensure maintainability of infrastructure e.g. COVID labs, ambulances, laboratories or veterinary practitioners to ensure treatment of directly and indirectly related health issues within a crisis. We concentrated on evaluating the usability of the disinfection technology presented in real-life settings. © 2022 IDIMT. All rights reserved.

The COVID-19 Pandemic as a Stress Test for Laboratory Safety Teams

Laboratory safety teams (LSTs), led by graduate student and postdoctoral researchers, have been propagating across the U.S. as a bottom-up approach to improving safety culture in academic research laboratories. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, LSTs relied heavily on in-person projects and events. Additionally, committed Champions from the ranks of safety professionals and faculty were critical to their operation and continued expansion. As was the case for many existing systems, the COVID-19 global crisis served as an operational stress test for LSTs, pushing them to unexpected new limits. The initial spread of COVID-19 brought with it a shutdown of academic institutions followed by a limited reopening that prohibited in-person gatherings and disrupted standard lines of communication upon which LSTs relied. Safety professionals and faculty members were required to take on new duties that were often undefined and time-consuming, substantially impacting their ability to support LSTs. In this case study, we report the impact of this operational stress test on 12 LSTs, detailing the adaptive means by which they survived and highlighting the key lessons learned by the represented LST leaders. The key takeaways were to spend time nurturing relationships with a diverse array of Champions, securing stable funding from multiple sources, and networking with members of LSTs from different institutions to strengthen moral support and broaden ideation for common challenges.

Laboratory diagnosis and management of COVID-19 cases: creating a safe testing environment.

BACKGROUND: COVID-19 disease has had a profound impact worldwide since it was discovered in Wuhan, China, in December 2019. Laboratory testing is crucial to prompt identification of positive cases, initiation of treatment and management strategies. However, medical scientists are vulnerable to infection due to the risk of exposure in the laboratory and the community. This study sought to determine the awareness of laboratory safety measures, assess the personal efforts of medical scientists in creating a safe laboratory environment for testing and examine the laboratory safety enabling factors. METHODS: The data used for the study were generated among medical scientists in Nigeria through an internet-broadcasted questionnaire and were analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics (version 25). RESULTS: The majority of the respondents had a high awareness of laboratory safety measures (60.3%) and demonstrated good personal efforts in creating a safe laboratory testing environment (63%). The level of awareness of laboratory safety measures was significantly associated with respondents' level of education (χ2 = 6.143; p = 0.046) and influences respondents' efforts in creating a safe laboratory testing environment (p = 0.007). However, just a few respondents could convincingly attest to the availability of adequate and appropriate PPE with proper utilization training (45.1%), adequate rest and other welfare packages (45.8%) as well as access to appropriate Biological Safety Cabinets (BSCs) and other essential equipment in their laboratories (48.8%). Furthermore, a significant association existed between the availability of laboratory safety enabling factors and respondents' efforts in creating a safe environment for testing with the p-value ranging between < 0.0001 and 0.003. CONCLUSION: This study revealed that despite the high awareness of safety measures and good personal efforts of the study participants in creating a safe laboratory-testing environment, there was poor availability of safety facilities, equipment, support and welfare packages required to enhance their safety. It is, therefore, crucial to provide necessary laboratory biosafety equipment and PPE in order not to compromise medical scientists' safety as they perform their duties in COVID-19 pandemic response.

Transfusion 2024: A 5-year plan for clinical and laboratory transfusion in England.

The Transfusion 2024 plan outlines key priorities for clinical and laboratory transfusion practice for safe patient care across the NHS for the next 5 years. It is based on the outcomes of a multi-professional symposium held in March 2019, organised by the National Blood Transfusion Committee (NBTC) and NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT), attended and supported by Professor Keith Willet and Dame Sue Hill on behalf of NHS England and Improvement. This best practice guidance contained within this publication will facilitate the necessary change in pathway design to meet the transfusion challenges and pressures for the restoration of a cohesive, and functional, healthcare system across the NHS following the COVID-19 pandemic.

Investigation of Extracellular Vesicles From SARS-CoV-2 Infected Specimens: A Safety Perspective.

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, is wreaking havoc around the world. Considering that extracellular vesicles (EVs) released from SARS-CoV-2 infected cells might play a role in a viremic phase contributing to disease progression and that standard methods for EV isolation have been reported to co-isolate viral particles, we would like to recommend the use of heightened laboratory safety measures during the isolation of EVs derived from SARS-CoV-2 infected tissue and blood from COVID-19 patients. Research needs to be conducted to better understand the role of EVs in SARS-CoV-2 infectivity, disease progression, and transmission. EV isolation procedures should include approaches for protection from SARS-CoV-2 contamination. We recommend the EV and virology scientific communities develop collaborative projects where relationships between endogenous EVs and potentially lethal enveloped viruses are addressed to better understand the risks and pathobiology involved.

Biosafety Concerns During the Collection, Transportation, and Processing of COVID-19 Samples for Diagnosis.

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, which started in China, has created a panic among the general public and health care/laboratory workers. Thus far, there is no medication or vaccine to prevent and control the spread of COVID-19. As the virus is airborne and transmitted through droplets, there has been significant demand for face masks and other personal protective equipment to prevent the spread of infection. Health care and laboratory workers who come in close contact with infected people or material are at a high risk of infection. Therefore, robust biosafety measures are required at hospitals and laboratories to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Various diagnostic platforms including of serological, molecular and other advanced tools and techniques have been designed and developed for rapid detection of SARS-CoV-2 and each has its own merits and demerits. Molecular assays such as real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) has been used worldwide for diagnosis of COVID-19. Samples such as nasal swabs or oropharyngeal swabs are used for rRT-PCR. Laboratory acquired infection has been a significant problem worldwide, which has gained importance during the current pandemic as the samples for rRT-PCR may contain intact virus with serious threat. COVID-19 can spread to workers during the sampling, transportation, processing, and disposal of tested samples. Here, we present an overview on advances in diagnosis of COVID-19 and details the issues associated with biosafety procedures and potential safety precautions to be followed during collection, transportation, and processing of COVID-19 samples for laboratory diagnosis so as to avoid virus infection.

SARS-CoV-2 RNA detected in blood products from patients with COVID-19 is not associated with infectious virus.

Background: Laboratory diagnosis of SARS-CoV-2 infection (the cause of COVID-19) uses PCR to detect viral RNA (vRNA) in respiratory samples. SARS-CoV-2 RNA has also been detected in other sample types, but there is limited understanding of the clinical or laboratory significance of its detection in blood. Methods: We undertook a systematic literature review to assimilate the evidence for the frequency of vRNA in blood, and to identify associated clinical characteristics. We performed RT-PCR in serum samples from a UK clinical cohort of acute and convalescent COVID-19 cases (n=212), together with convalescent plasma samples collected by NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) (n=462 additional samples). To determine whether PCR-positive blood samples could pose an infection risk, we attempted virus isolation from a subset of RNA-positive samples. Results: We identified 28 relevant studies, reporting SARS-CoV-2 RNA in 0-76% of blood samples; pooled estimate 10% (95%CI 5-18%). Among serum samples from our clinical cohort, 27/212 (12.7%) had SARS-CoV-2 RNA detected by RT-PCR. RNA detection occurred in samples up to day 20 post symptom onset, and was associated with more severe disease (multivariable odds ratio 7.5). Across all samples collected ≥28 days post symptom onset, 0/494 (0%, 95%CI 0-0.7%) had vRNA detected. Among our PCR-positive samples, cycle threshold (ct) values were high (range 33.5-44.8), suggesting low vRNA copy numbers. PCR-positive sera inoculated into cell culture did not produce any cytopathic effect or yield an increase in detectable SARS-CoV-2 RNA. Conclusions: vRNA was detectable at low viral loads in a minority of serum samples collected in acute infection, but was not associated with infectious SARS-CoV-2 (within the limitations of the assays used). This work helps to inform biosafety precautions for handling blood products from patients with current or previous COVID-19.

Opportunities and Risks for Research Biobanks in the COVID-19 Era and Beyond.

The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, which caused a global outbreak of COVID-19 disease, has been a crisis of extraordinary proportions, causing serious impacts for research and public health. Biobanks have played a key important role in understanding the disease and response. In our article we will highlight the opportunities and risks of biobanks during and after the pandemic. The different aspects of safety and sustainability have and will be the main challenges for biobanks. Furthermore, the role of biobanks in biomedical research and public health has been emphasized as well as opportunities that have arisen for their participation in research.

Facing the 2020 pandemic: What does cyberbiosecurity want us to know to safeguard the future?

As the entire world is under the grip of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), and as many are eagerly trying to explain the origins of the virus and cause of the pandemic, it is imperative to place more attention on related potential biosafety risks. Biology and biotechnology have changed dramatically during the last ten years or so. Their reliance on digitization, automation, and their cyber-overlaps have created new vulnerabilities for unintended consequences and potentials for intended exploitation that are mostly under-appreciated. This study summarizes and elaborates on these new cyberbiosecurity challenges, (1) in terms of comprehending the evolving threat landscape and determining new risk potentials, (2) in developing adequate safeguarding measures, their validation and implementation, and (3) specific critical risks and consequences, many of them unique to the life-sciences. Drawing other's expertise and my previous work, this article reviews and critically interprets our current bio-economy situation. The goal is not to attribute causative aspects of past biosafety or biosecurity events, but to highlight the fact that the bioeconomy harbors unique features that have to be more critically assessed for their potential to unintentionally cause harm to human health or environment, or to be re-tasked with an intention to cause harm. It is concluded with recommendations that will need to be considered to help ensure converging and emerging biorisk challenges, in order to minimize vulnerabilities to the life-science enterprise, public health, and national security.

Laboratory Biosafety Considerations of SARS-CoV-2 at Biosafety Level 2.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is the pathogen that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), which was first detected in Wuhan, China. Recent studies have updated the epidemiologic and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 continuously. In China, diagnostic tests and laboratory tests of specimens from persons under investigation are usually performed in a biosafety level 2 environment. Laboratory staff may be at greater risk of exposure due to a higher concentration and invasiveness of emerging pathogens. Current infection prevention strategies are based on lessons learned from severe acute respiratory syndrome, expert judgments, and related regulations. This article summarizes biosafety prevention and control measures performed in severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 testing activities and provides practical suggestions for laboratory staff to avoid laboratory-acquired infections in dealing with public health emergencies.